( All times in CET! )
 |
| Any of our team members at the isle of Rugya (Baltic Sea) last friday |
- RADIO TINA, 6300kcs, 19.00hrs, SINPO 44233
( Oldies )
- UNID ON 6205kcs, 20.08hrs, SINPO 4334,3-4
( Instrumental music )
- RADIO TINA, 6295kcs, 20.12hrs, SINPO 33333
( Polka music and talks in German )
- RADIO BLUEBIRD, 1638kcs, 21.02hrs, SINPO 2-3,424,2-3 (at 21.38hrs: 34233)
( Dutch music )
- RADIO SAPPORO, 1654kcs, 21.18hrs, SINPO 24242
( Dutch music )
- RADIO VUURVOGEL, 1620kcs, 21.30hrs, SINPO 34233
( Dutch music )
- RADIO MAZDA, 6320kcs, 22.00hrs, SINPO 44434
( Dutch music )
- RADIO EETHERFREAK, 6260kcs, 23.35hrs, SINPO 2-3,423,2-3
( Pop oldy )
- RADIO RONEX, 6285kcs, 23.38hrs, SINPO 34233
( Pop oldy )
- RADIO BATAVIA, 1611kcs, 23.41hrs, SINPO 2-3,4232
( Pop oldy )
- RADIO NOORDZEE, 1654kcs, 23.49hrs, SINPO 44344
( Pop-country oldy )
- UNID ON 6210kcs, 00.27hrs, SINPO 2-3,423,2-3
( Instrumental music )
- RADIO SOERABAYA, 1647kcs, 00.30hrs, SINPO 2-3,4232
( Dutch music )
- RADIO JENEVERSTOKER, 1654kcs, 00.52hrs, SINPO 3423,3-2
( Dutch music, report in Dutch )
German companies sell spy software to totalitarian states:
( Article in German)
Neue WikiLeaks-Enthüllungen
Deutsche Software für Despoten
Deutsche Ingenieurskunst wird weltweit
geschätzt. Gleiches gilt auch für die Arbeit deutscher
Softwareschmieden: Dokumente der Whistleblower-Plattform WikiLeaks, die
dem NDR vorliegen, belegen: Deutsche Unternehmen liefern
Überwachungssoftware an Despoten in aller Welt.
Guter Kunde bei deutschen Softwareschmieden: Turkmenistans Präsident Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow (Mitte)
Autoritäre Regime in der ganzen Welt können bei
der Überwachung ihrer Bürger auf deutsche Computerprogramme zählen. Das
zeigen neue Unterlagen von WikiLeaks, die der Norddeutsche Rundfunk und
die "Süddeutsche Zeitung" vorab einsehen konnten. Die
Whistleblower-Plattform wird die Dokumente in den kommenden Tagen ins
Netz stellen.
Darunter sind vor allem Broschüren und
Präsentationen, in denen die private Überwachungsfirmen ihre Dienste
anpreisen: Von handlichen Retina-Scannern für unterwegs, über
Glasfaser-Anzapfsysteme, bis hin zu ausgeklügelten Komplettlösungen für
die Überwachung von Handy und Internet bieten die Firmen alles an, was
Geheimdienstler begeistert. Auch eine Datenbank mit Mobilfunkabfragen,
in der Auslandsreisen der Entwickler und Manager vermerkt sind, ist Teil
der WikiLeaks-Enthüllungen. Sie zeigen, wie umtriebig die Firmen in der
Kundenakquise sind - nicht immer mit Rücksicht auf die
Menschenrechtslage in den einzelnen Ländern.
Die Unternehmen geizen in den Werbeheften nicht
mit Eigenlob: Die Münchener Software-Entwickler der Firma Gamma bewerben
eines ihrer Produkte als derart anwenderfreundlich, dass beispielsweise
eine Reinigungskraft in einem Bürokomplex einen Computer infizieren
kann - quasi im vorbeigehen und absolut unbemerkt. Die so installierte
Software funkt dann, selbst für Fachleute schwer zu enttarnen, die
gesamte Kommunikation des Rechners an den Gamma-Kunden, der dafür zahlt:
Bis zu 250.000 Euro kostet das Programm, je nach Lizenz.
"Schlüsselfertige Lösungen" für Despoten
Und auch ohne physischen Zugriff auf den
Zielcomputer bietet Gamma Lösungen: Über Vertriebspartner hat Gamma eine
Software nach Turkmenistan angeboten, die in nationale
Internet-Knotenpunkte eingepflanzt wird und von dort die Überwachung
einzelner Internet-Nutzer ermöglicht: Ein maßgefertigter
"Staatstrojaner" für den Despoten, Turkmenistans Präsidenten Gurbanguly
Berdimuhammedow.
Die Firma Atis Uher brüstet sich in einer
undatierten Präsentation damit, dass "Klarios", ihre Software zur
Kommunikationsüberwachung, im Nahen Osten einen Marktanteil von 50
Prozent aufweist - und in Deutschland ebenfalls. Was "Klarios" konkret
kann, erklärt eine andere Folie: Laut Hersteller lässt sich mit der in
Bad Homburg entwickelten Software der Internet-Verkehr per Kabel und
Satelliten analysieren, auch Vorratsdatenspeicherung beherrscht das
System. Und wenn das nicht reicht, hat Atis Uher auch noch eine weitere
Software parat, mit der sich Sprachdaten speichern und auswerten lassen -
das Paket bewirbt die Firma als "schlüsselfertige Lösung aus einer
Hand". Nach eigener Aussage wichtigste Zielgruppe: die Staaten im Nahen
und Mittleren Osten.
Das Who-is-Who der Demokratiefeinde kauft ein
Kopie eines Angebots für Spionagesoftware
Atis Uher hat eine Anfrage des NDR zu ihren
Produkten nicht beantwortet. Die WikiLeaks-Dokumente belegen, wie sich
die Firmen dabei die lukrativen Märkte untereinander aufgeteilt zu
haben. So geht aus den Unterlagen hervor, dass die Münchener
Software-Entwickler von Gamma und die Schweizer Firma Dreamlab ein
Abkommen darüber geschlossen haben, wer mit welchen Ländern und welchen
Partnern Verträge abschließen darf. Gamma verbietet seinem
Geschäftspartner beispielsweise, Internet-Überwachungssoftware nach
"Afrika, Naher , Mittlerer und Ferner Osten" zu verkaufen - wohlwissend,
dass sich vor allem Despoten dafür interessieren dürften, was in ihren
Staaten im Netz passiert. Dreamlab-Geschäftsführer Nicolas Mayencourt
sagte dem NDR auf Anfrage, dass seine Firma sich von staatlicher
Computerüberwachung distanziere und nicht mehr mit Gamma
zusammenarbeite. Gamma selbst hat auf NDR-Anfragen nicht reagiert.
Mithilfe der Datenbank aus den
WikiLeaks-Dokumenten lassen sich die Geschäftsbeziehungen einiger
deutscher Firmen, die im Bereich der Telekommunikationsüberwachung tätig
sind, nachzeichnen. Außendienstler, Programmierer und Manager von
Trovicor, Utimaco, Elaman und vor allem von Gamma - allesamt deutsche
Entwickler oder Vertriebspartner von Überwachungsprogrammen - sind viel
unterwegs. Und die Liste der Länder liest sich wie ein Who-is-Who der
Demokratiefeinde: Äquatorial Guinea, Äthiopien, Nigeria, die
Elfenbeinküste, Uganda, Jordanien, Katar, der Oman, die Vereinigten
Arabischen Emirate, Kasachstan, Malaysia, Turkmenistan und Bahrain.
Die verdächtige Firma schweigt
Jugendliche fliehen vor den Tränengasschwaden in
Bahrain. Die Aktivisten dort sollen mit deutscher Software ausgespäht
worden sein.
Gamma musste sich bereits im Juli 2012 vorwerfen
lassen, seine Produkte an das Regime in Bahrain verkauft zu haben.
Menschenrechtler von "Bahrain Watch" konnten damals anhand von
Server-Protokollen nachweisen, dass das Überwachungsprogramm "FinSpy"
gegen Aktivisten eingesetzt worden war. Die Firma dementierte die
Vorwürfe damals und behauptete, es handle sich um eine illegale Kopie.
Die nun veröffentlichten Unterlagen belegen allerdings, dass ein
Gamma-Manager in diesem Jahr mindestens zwei Mal - im März und im Juli -
nach Bahrain gefahren ist. Was er dort getan hat und ob die Reisen in
einem Zusammenhang mit der Gamma-Software stehen - auch dazu äußerte
sich das Unternehmen nicht.
Eine Zusammenarbeit mit Staaten wie Bahrain oder
Turkmenistan, in dem Oppositionelle systematisch unterdrückt werden,
wäre nicht nur für Gamma unangenehm zu erklären. Auch die
Bundesregierung müsste sich ungemütliche Fragen gefallen lassen. Denn
das Bundeskriminalamt hat im Januar dieses Jahres zugegeben, einen
sogenannten "Staatstrojaner" von Gamma gekauft zu haben.
Stand: 04.09.2013 20:21 Uhr
NSA-GERMANY-POFALLA..whats this???
( Article in German )
04.09.2013 13:04
NSA-Überwachungsskandal: Pofalla druckt Abgeordneten Internet aus
Seite aus dem übergebenen Ordner
Bild: Thomas Oppermann Da die überreichten Unterlagen aber offenbar genauso intensiv geschwärzt sind wie die Versionen im Internet, sind sie für die Abgeordneten höchstens begrenzt aussagefähig. Trotzdem habe Pofalla so gewirkt, als sei er stolz auf das Erreichte. Die Dokumente würden unterstreichen, dass die NSA bereit sei, die erhobenen Vorwürfe zu entkräften. Im Anschluss an die Sitzung erklärte er noch, die Aufklärung komme gut voran. Er sei "sehr zufrieden" mit dem eingeleiteten Prozess.
Die Opposition zeigte sich dagegen unzufrieden mit dem Vorgetragenen. Hans-Christian Ströbele und Steffen Bockhahn, die Vertreter der Grünen und der Linkspartei, forderten mehr Akteneinsicht. Immer noch sei zu befürchten, dass der US-Geheimdienst im großen Stil deutsche Daten abgreift, erklärte Bockhahn. Oppermann gehen darüber hinaus die Pläne für ein Anti-Spionage-Abkommen zwischen BND und NSA nicht weit genug. "Wir brauchen ein Regierungsabkommen, kein Stillhalteabkommen", zitiert in die Deutsche Welle. (mho)
Brazil's Rousseff wants U.S. apology for NSA spying
By Brian WinterSAO PAULO (Reuters) - Furious about a report that the U.S. government spied on her private communications, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff may cancel a planned White House visit and downgrade commercial ties unless she receives a public apology, a senior Brazilian official told Reuters on Wednesday.
A Brazilian news program reported on Sunday that the U.S. National Security Agency spied on emails, phone calls and text messages of Rousseff and Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto. The report by Globo TV was based on documents leaked by fugitive former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
Rousseff is due to make a formal state visit to Washington next month to meet U.S. President Barack Obama and discuss a possible $4 billion jet-fighter deal, cooperation on oil and biofuels technology, as well as other commercial agreements.
The visit, which is the only such invitation extended by Obama this year, was meant to highlight a recent improvement in relations between the two biggest economies in the Americas, as well as Brazil's emergence over the past decade as a vibrant economy and regional power.
But the official, who declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the episode, said Rousseff feels "patronized" by the U.S. response so far to the Globo report. She is prepared to cancel the visit as well as take punitive action, including ruling out the purchase of F-18 Super Hornet fighters from Chicago-based Boeing Co, the official said.
"She is completely furious," the official said.
"This is a major, major crisis .... There needs to be an apology. It needs to be public. Without that, it's basically impossible for her to go to Washington in October," the official said.
Obama and Rousseff are scheduled to attend a Group of 20 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia this week. However, as of Wednesday afternoon, the two leaders had no bilateral meeting scheduled, the official said.
Rousseff is a moderate leftist but comes from a party with roots in trade unions and a historic mistrust of the United States. Local analysts have said it would be politically difficult for her to participate in the pomp of a state visit, which includes a black-tie dinner at the White House, so soon after allegations that Washington was spying on her.
On Monday, Rousseff's foreign minister demanded a written response to the Globo report from the U.S. government by the end of this week. A foreign ministry official told Reuters there had been no response by Wednesday afternoon.
Communications Minister Paulo Bernardo, one of Rousseff's most trusted aides, told reporters late on Tuesday that the spying was "more serious than it seemed upon first impressions," which may help explain why Brazil is now seeking an apology in addition to the written explanation.
OBAMA SAYS U.S. TARGETS 'AREAS OF CONCERN'
Obama, speaking in Sweden on Wednesday on his way to the G-20 summit, said that U.S. intelligence agencies are not "snooping at people's emails or listening to their phone calls.
"What we try to do is to target, very specifically, areas of concern," he said, adding that such areas included counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and cyber-security.
Brazilian officials are skeptical as to how Rousseff's private communications would have fallen into those categories. Brazil is not a known base of operations for terrorists, it does not produce nuclear weapons and it has been a stable democracy and U.S. ally in South America for the last three decades.
Obama also said on Wednesday that safeguards should be strengthened to make sure surveillance programs stay within certain parameters. "Just because we can do something doesn't mean we should do it," he said.
The Globo report showed what it said was an NSA slide dated June 2012 displaying communication patterns between Rousseff and her top advisers.
That slide, and a separate one showing written messages sent by Mexico's Pena Nieto when he was still a candidate, were part of an NSA case study showing how data could be "intelligently" filtered by the agency, Globo said.
The report was based on documents obtained from Snowden by journalist Glenn Greenwald, who lives in Rio de Janeiro.
Bernardo, the communications minister, said Brazil had yet to receive any "reasonable" explanation from the United States.
Globo newspaper published a separate set of documents in July that it said showed the NSA targeted several Latin American countries in its spying program, including Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.
"All of the explanations that have been given to us from the beginning of these episodes have proven to be false," Bernardo said. "I think it's indiscriminate spying that has nothing to do with national security ... It's espionage with a commercial, industrial aim."
The Brazilian official speaking to Reuters compared the current crisis to the last time the two countries publicly clashed - in 2010, when Rousseff's predecessor tried to broker a deal over Iran's nuclear program. The mediation did not succeed, and sparked a wave of recriminations between Washington and Brasilia that Rousseff has since tried to move past.
"This is far worse than Iran," the official said.
When will Obama get serious about NSA reform?
Last week, President Obama met with the
five-member review board that he recently appointed to review the
National Security Agency’s (NSA) controversial electronic surveillance
program. The review board is part of the president’s effort to build
confidence in the surveillance program and its respect for privacy
rights.
But when Obama speaks about the program, he leaves the impression that its existing privacy protections are sufficient, if only we knew enough to appreciate them. That hardly instills confidence. If the president is serious about fixing the enormous overreach of U.S. surveillance that Edward Snowden helped to highlight, he should take these steps:
First, recognize 4th Amendment protection for our metadata. More than 30 years ago, in a different technological era, the Supreme Court ruled that, unlike the content of our phone conversations, we have no privacy rights in the numbers we call. The rationale was that we share those numbers with the phone company. The intrusion mattered little at the time because if the police wanted to reconstruct someone’s circle of contacts, they had to undertake the enormously time-consuming process of manually linking phone number to phone number.
Today, though, with a few computer commands, the government can easily reconstruct our entire direct and extended network of phone and email contacts, as well as (using the GPS signals from our phone) everywhere we visit. That astonishingly detailed picture of our lives – our metadata — can be more revealing of private matters than even the contents of our communications.
Moreover, the claim that we give up our privacy rights by sharing this data with communications companies makes no sense. We “share” the contents of our emails as well, and those are better protected by the 4th Amendment. Moreover, in today’s world, we have no real choice but to share our contact data if we are to communicate with anyone other than by word of mouth. In what amounted to a warning, a majority of the Supreme Court justices hinted last year that at least some of this data should receive 4th Amendment protection. The administration should get in front of the issue and propose legislation before the court rules for it.
Second, recognize the privacy rights of non-Americans outside the United States. Because the courts have interpreted the U.S. Constitution to protect the rights of American citizens and legal residents everywhere, but non-Americans only in the United States, the U.S. government recognizes no privacy rights for non-Americans abroad. It thus intercepts even the content of their communications with few restrictions. Needless to say, that intrusion does not go over well with the rest of the world. This narrow view of privacy also lets the government review the content when Americans communicate with others overseas, so long as the American is not the “target” of the surveillance. In a world where international communication is routine, this parochial view of privacy makes no sense.
Moreover, it is a disaster for U.S. Internet companies, which aspire to serve the world but risk losing business to competitors in foreign countries that recognize privacy rights for non-Americans. And if distrust of the United States yields pressure to move servers to where users are, all companies become more vulnerable to probing by governments like China, whose interest may not be simply fighting terrorism but also fighting dissent. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, international human rights law protects everyone, including the right to privacy. That’s not how the U.S. government likes to read the law, but it should.
Third, treat privacy rights as implicated as soon as information is collected. One favorite refrain of the NSA is to claim that our privacy rights are not affected when our communications are scooped up and stored in a government computer, only when an official examines that information. The NSA then insists we have nothing to worry about because the rules for “querying” this information are strict. But that logic crumbles on examination. Would our privacy interest in blocking the government from placing a video camera in our bedroom begin only when someone actually looked at the film?
Moreover, once our communications are in government computers, they are there for the long haul — in some cases five years or more — yet rules on querying them can change with administration or even time. The government claims it needs to store our communications because private companies may erase them too soon, but people tend to be more comfortable with private storage (competition is a restraint on private abuse that does not exist for the government). In any event, the NSA has been unable to identify any terrorist plot that would have remained concealed but for its undifferentiated scooping up of our metadata. That is true for even the most recent parts of its vast database, let alone the parts held for five or more years.
Fourth, revamp the FISA court. The administration’s case for the legality of its electronic surveillance depends on scrutiny by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, yet the court hardly engenders confidence. Its members are hand-picked by Chief Justice John Roberts (until recently, he picked only conservative Republican appointees), it hears only from the government, and its opinions have mostly been kept secret. It is difficult for any judge to evaluate the government’s claims when no one is there to challenge its evidence and arguments, especially in so technically complex an area as electronic surveillance — as the court’s chief judge recently conceded. Efforts to justify this process by analogy to judges who privately hear from only the government to approve an ordinary search warrant are off base because most of those warrants can ultimately be challenged in a public adversarial hearing as part of a criminal prosecution.
At minimum, as Obama has suggested, the FISA court should hear from a government-appointed “devil’s advocate,” who would have the necessary security clearances and could challenge the government’s case without tipping off the surveillance target. That person should have the right to appeal adverse rulings to a higher tribunal and ultimately the Supreme Court. A presumption of public disclosure should govern all FISA court opinions about general surveillance policy and the right to privacy, since excessive secrecy has helped the surveillance state flourish.
Fifth, protect whistleblowers. The whistleblower protection provided to government employees who expose evidence of wrongdoing does not extend to those who disclose what is deemed national security information. Whistleblowers facing prosecution can’t even defend themselves by showing that their disclosures caused no harm and promoted the public interest. Wrongdoing involving this information is supposed to be revealed only to an agency’s inspector general or to the congressional intelligence committees. Yet government employees who tried to use these procedures to complain about NSA overreaching faced retaliation and even prosecution – which might help explain why Snowden skipped these mechanisms and went directly to the media. The problem is aggravated by the government’s temptation to protect information that is simply embarrassing or politically fraught rather than truly a matter of national security. A better balance should be struck between the government’s interest in keeping certain information secret and Americans’ right to know when government activities violate their rights.
Finally, appoint a meaningful reform commission. There’s a real need for an independent reform group with the security clearances and technical expertise needed to review all aspects of U.S. electronic surveillance and to publicly suggest reforms. The five-person group that Obama recently created purports to be such a commission, but its mandate as publicly announced does not even mention privacy, going only so far as to ask whether U.S. intelligence collection “appropriately account[s] for other policy considerations.” Only after the group’s first meeting did a White House press release finally mention the “p———” word as well as “civil liberties.” The White House should make clear that these key concerns are part of the group’s mandate, including the privacy rights of both Americans and non-Americans.
We have learned enough about the NSA’s overreach to know there are real problems with its electronic surveillance. Obama arguing that we should just trust him will no longer placate concerns. Real reform is needed to convince us that in the NSA’s preoccupation with security, our privacy rights have not been lost.
But when Obama speaks about the program, he leaves the impression that its existing privacy protections are sufficient, if only we knew enough to appreciate them. That hardly instills confidence. If the president is serious about fixing the enormous overreach of U.S. surveillance that Edward Snowden helped to highlight, he should take these steps:
First, recognize 4th Amendment protection for our metadata. More than 30 years ago, in a different technological era, the Supreme Court ruled that, unlike the content of our phone conversations, we have no privacy rights in the numbers we call. The rationale was that we share those numbers with the phone company. The intrusion mattered little at the time because if the police wanted to reconstruct someone’s circle of contacts, they had to undertake the enormously time-consuming process of manually linking phone number to phone number.
Today, though, with a few computer commands, the government can easily reconstruct our entire direct and extended network of phone and email contacts, as well as (using the GPS signals from our phone) everywhere we visit. That astonishingly detailed picture of our lives – our metadata — can be more revealing of private matters than even the contents of our communications.
Moreover, the claim that we give up our privacy rights by sharing this data with communications companies makes no sense. We “share” the contents of our emails as well, and those are better protected by the 4th Amendment. Moreover, in today’s world, we have no real choice but to share our contact data if we are to communicate with anyone other than by word of mouth. In what amounted to a warning, a majority of the Supreme Court justices hinted last year that at least some of this data should receive 4th Amendment protection. The administration should get in front of the issue and propose legislation before the court rules for it.
Second, recognize the privacy rights of non-Americans outside the United States. Because the courts have interpreted the U.S. Constitution to protect the rights of American citizens and legal residents everywhere, but non-Americans only in the United States, the U.S. government recognizes no privacy rights for non-Americans abroad. It thus intercepts even the content of their communications with few restrictions. Needless to say, that intrusion does not go over well with the rest of the world. This narrow view of privacy also lets the government review the content when Americans communicate with others overseas, so long as the American is not the “target” of the surveillance. In a world where international communication is routine, this parochial view of privacy makes no sense.
Moreover, it is a disaster for U.S. Internet companies, which aspire to serve the world but risk losing business to competitors in foreign countries that recognize privacy rights for non-Americans. And if distrust of the United States yields pressure to move servers to where users are, all companies become more vulnerable to probing by governments like China, whose interest may not be simply fighting terrorism but also fighting dissent. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, international human rights law protects everyone, including the right to privacy. That’s not how the U.S. government likes to read the law, but it should.
Third, treat privacy rights as implicated as soon as information is collected. One favorite refrain of the NSA is to claim that our privacy rights are not affected when our communications are scooped up and stored in a government computer, only when an official examines that information. The NSA then insists we have nothing to worry about because the rules for “querying” this information are strict. But that logic crumbles on examination. Would our privacy interest in blocking the government from placing a video camera in our bedroom begin only when someone actually looked at the film?
Moreover, once our communications are in government computers, they are there for the long haul — in some cases five years or more — yet rules on querying them can change with administration or even time. The government claims it needs to store our communications because private companies may erase them too soon, but people tend to be more comfortable with private storage (competition is a restraint on private abuse that does not exist for the government). In any event, the NSA has been unable to identify any terrorist plot that would have remained concealed but for its undifferentiated scooping up of our metadata. That is true for even the most recent parts of its vast database, let alone the parts held for five or more years.
Fourth, revamp the FISA court. The administration’s case for the legality of its electronic surveillance depends on scrutiny by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, yet the court hardly engenders confidence. Its members are hand-picked by Chief Justice John Roberts (until recently, he picked only conservative Republican appointees), it hears only from the government, and its opinions have mostly been kept secret. It is difficult for any judge to evaluate the government’s claims when no one is there to challenge its evidence and arguments, especially in so technically complex an area as electronic surveillance — as the court’s chief judge recently conceded. Efforts to justify this process by analogy to judges who privately hear from only the government to approve an ordinary search warrant are off base because most of those warrants can ultimately be challenged in a public adversarial hearing as part of a criminal prosecution.
At minimum, as Obama has suggested, the FISA court should hear from a government-appointed “devil’s advocate,” who would have the necessary security clearances and could challenge the government’s case without tipping off the surveillance target. That person should have the right to appeal adverse rulings to a higher tribunal and ultimately the Supreme Court. A presumption of public disclosure should govern all FISA court opinions about general surveillance policy and the right to privacy, since excessive secrecy has helped the surveillance state flourish.
Fifth, protect whistleblowers. The whistleblower protection provided to government employees who expose evidence of wrongdoing does not extend to those who disclose what is deemed national security information. Whistleblowers facing prosecution can’t even defend themselves by showing that their disclosures caused no harm and promoted the public interest. Wrongdoing involving this information is supposed to be revealed only to an agency’s inspector general or to the congressional intelligence committees. Yet government employees who tried to use these procedures to complain about NSA overreaching faced retaliation and even prosecution – which might help explain why Snowden skipped these mechanisms and went directly to the media. The problem is aggravated by the government’s temptation to protect information that is simply embarrassing or politically fraught rather than truly a matter of national security. A better balance should be struck between the government’s interest in keeping certain information secret and Americans’ right to know when government activities violate their rights.
Finally, appoint a meaningful reform commission. There’s a real need for an independent reform group with the security clearances and technical expertise needed to review all aspects of U.S. electronic surveillance and to publicly suggest reforms. The five-person group that Obama recently created purports to be such a commission, but its mandate as publicly announced does not even mention privacy, going only so far as to ask whether U.S. intelligence collection “appropriately account[s] for other policy considerations.” Only after the group’s first meeting did a White House press release finally mention the “p———” word as well as “civil liberties.” The White House should make clear that these key concerns are part of the group’s mandate, including the privacy rights of both Americans and non-Americans.
We have learned enough about the NSA’s overreach to know there are real problems with its electronic surveillance. Obama arguing that we should just trust him will no longer placate concerns. Real reform is needed to convince us that in the NSA’s preoccupation with security, our privacy rights have not been lost.
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