( All times in CET! )
|Any of our team members at the isle of Rugya (Baltic Sea) last friday|
- RADIO TINA, 6300kcs, 19.00hrs, SINPO 44233
( Oldies )
- UNID ON 6205kcs, 20.08hrs, SINPO 4334,3-4
( Instrumental music )
- RADIO TINA, 6295kcs, 20.12hrs, SINPO 33333
( Polka music and talks in German )
- RADIO BLUEBIRD, 1638kcs, 21.02hrs, SINPO 2-3,424,2-3 (at 21.38hrs: 34233)
( Dutch music )
- RADIO SAPPORO, 1654kcs, 21.18hrs, SINPO 24242
( Dutch music )
- RADIO VUURVOGEL, 1620kcs, 21.30hrs, SINPO 34233
( Dutch music )
- RADIO MAZDA, 6320kcs, 22.00hrs, SINPO 44434
( Dutch music )
- RADIO EETHERFREAK, 6260kcs, 23.35hrs, SINPO 2-3,423,2-3
( Pop oldy )
- RADIO RONEX, 6285kcs, 23.38hrs, SINPO 34233
( Pop oldy )
- RADIO BATAVIA, 1611kcs, 23.41hrs, SINPO 2-3,4232
( Pop oldy )
- RADIO NOORDZEE, 1654kcs, 23.49hrs, SINPO 44344
( Pop-country oldy )
- UNID ON 6210kcs, 00.27hrs, SINPO 2-3,423,2-3
( Instrumental music )
- RADIO SOERABAYA, 1647kcs, 00.30hrs, SINPO 2-3,4232
( Dutch music )
- RADIO JENEVERSTOKER, 1654kcs, 00.52hrs, SINPO 3423,3-2
( Dutch music, report in Dutch )
German companies sell spy software to totalitarian states:
( Article in German)
Deutsche Software für Despoten
"Schlüsselfertige Lösungen" für Despoten
Das Who-is-Who der Demokratiefeinde kauft ein
Die verdächtige Firma schweigt
( Article in German )
NSA-Überwachungsskandal: Pofalla druckt Abgeordneten Internet aus
für beendet erklärt hatte, übergab er in der gestrigen Sitzung den Abgeordneten einen Ordner mit Dokumenten. Die allerdings stehen bereits seit Wochen im Internet. Das geht unter anderem aus einem Foto hervor, das der Gremiumsvorsitzende Thomas Oppermann (SPD) am Dienstag auf Twitter veröffentlichte. Es zeigt eine vollständig geschwärzte Seite aus einem Dokument, das in dieser Form bereits am 21. August ins Internet gestellt wurde (Seite 4) und damit für jeden einsehbar ist. Dass auch die anderen übergebenen Unterlagen bereits im Netz stehen, habe Pofalla eingestanden, erklärte ein Mitglied des Gremiums gegenüber heise online.
Seite aus dem übergebenen Ordner
Bild: Thomas Oppermann Da die überreichten Unterlagen aber offenbar genauso intensiv geschwärzt sind wie die Versionen im Internet, sind sie für die Abgeordneten höchstens begrenzt aussagefähig. Trotzdem habe Pofalla so gewirkt, als sei er stolz auf das Erreichte. Die Dokumente würden unterstreichen, dass die NSA bereit sei, die erhobenen Vorwürfe zu entkräften. Im Anschluss an die Sitzung erklärte er noch, die Aufklärung komme gut voran. Er sei "sehr zufrieden" mit dem eingeleiteten Prozess.
Die Opposition zeigte sich dagegen unzufrieden mit dem Vorgetragenen. Hans-Christian Ströbele und Steffen Bockhahn, die Vertreter der Grünen und der Linkspartei, forderten mehr Akteneinsicht. Immer noch sei zu befürchten, dass der US-Geheimdienst im großen Stil deutsche Daten abgreift, erklärte Bockhahn. Oppermann gehen darüber hinaus die Pläne für ein Anti-Spionage-Abkommen zwischen BND und NSA nicht weit genug. "Wir brauchen ein Regierungsabkommen, kein Stillhalteabkommen", zitiert in die Deutsche Welle. (mho)
Brazil's Rousseff wants U.S. apology for NSA spyingBy Brian Winter
SAO PAULO (Reuters) - Furious about a report that the U.S. government spied on her private communications, Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff may cancel a planned White House visit and downgrade commercial ties unless she receives a public apology, a senior Brazilian official told Reuters on Wednesday.
A Brazilian news program reported on Sunday that the U.S. National Security Agency spied on emails, phone calls and text messages of Rousseff and Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto. The report by Globo TV was based on documents leaked by fugitive former NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
Rousseff is due to make a formal state visit to Washington next month to meet U.S. President Barack Obama and discuss a possible $4 billion jet-fighter deal, cooperation on oil and biofuels technology, as well as other commercial agreements.
The visit, which is the only such invitation extended by Obama this year, was meant to highlight a recent improvement in relations between the two biggest economies in the Americas, as well as Brazil's emergence over the past decade as a vibrant economy and regional power.
But the official, who declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the episode, said Rousseff feels "patronized" by the U.S. response so far to the Globo report. She is prepared to cancel the visit as well as take punitive action, including ruling out the purchase of F-18 Super Hornet fighters from Chicago-based Boeing Co, the official said.
"She is completely furious," the official said.
"This is a major, major crisis .... There needs to be an apology. It needs to be public. Without that, it's basically impossible for her to go to Washington in October," the official said.
Obama and Rousseff are scheduled to attend a Group of 20 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia this week. However, as of Wednesday afternoon, the two leaders had no bilateral meeting scheduled, the official said.
Rousseff is a moderate leftist but comes from a party with roots in trade unions and a historic mistrust of the United States. Local analysts have said it would be politically difficult for her to participate in the pomp of a state visit, which includes a black-tie dinner at the White House, so soon after allegations that Washington was spying on her.
On Monday, Rousseff's foreign minister demanded a written response to the Globo report from the U.S. government by the end of this week. A foreign ministry official told Reuters there had been no response by Wednesday afternoon.
Communications Minister Paulo Bernardo, one of Rousseff's most trusted aides, told reporters late on Tuesday that the spying was "more serious than it seemed upon first impressions," which may help explain why Brazil is now seeking an apology in addition to the written explanation.
OBAMA SAYS U.S. TARGETS 'AREAS OF CONCERN'
Obama, speaking in Sweden on Wednesday on his way to the G-20 summit, said that U.S. intelligence agencies are not "snooping at people's emails or listening to their phone calls.
"What we try to do is to target, very specifically, areas of concern," he said, adding that such areas included counter-terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and cyber-security.
Brazilian officials are skeptical as to how Rousseff's private communications would have fallen into those categories. Brazil is not a known base of operations for terrorists, it does not produce nuclear weapons and it has been a stable democracy and U.S. ally in South America for the last three decades.
Obama also said on Wednesday that safeguards should be strengthened to make sure surveillance programs stay within certain parameters. "Just because we can do something doesn't mean we should do it," he said.
The Globo report showed what it said was an NSA slide dated June 2012 displaying communication patterns between Rousseff and her top advisers.
That slide, and a separate one showing written messages sent by Mexico's Pena Nieto when he was still a candidate, were part of an NSA case study showing how data could be "intelligently" filtered by the agency, Globo said.
The report was based on documents obtained from Snowden by journalist Glenn Greenwald, who lives in Rio de Janeiro.
Bernardo, the communications minister, said Brazil had yet to receive any "reasonable" explanation from the United States.
Globo newspaper published a separate set of documents in July that it said showed the NSA targeted several Latin American countries in its spying program, including Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.
"All of the explanations that have been given to us from the beginning of these episodes have proven to be false," Bernardo said. "I think it's indiscriminate spying that has nothing to do with national security ... It's espionage with a commercial, industrial aim."
The Brazilian official speaking to Reuters compared the current crisis to the last time the two countries publicly clashed - in 2010, when Rousseff's predecessor tried to broker a deal over Iran's nuclear program. The mediation did not succeed, and sparked a wave of recriminations between Washington and Brasilia that Rousseff has since tried to move past.
"This is far worse than Iran," the official said.
When will Obama get serious about NSA reform?
But when Obama speaks about the program, he leaves the impression that its existing privacy protections are sufficient, if only we knew enough to appreciate them. That hardly instills confidence. If the president is serious about fixing the enormous overreach of U.S. surveillance that Edward Snowden helped to highlight, he should take these steps:
First, recognize 4th Amendment protection for our metadata. More than 30 years ago, in a different technological era, the Supreme Court ruled that, unlike the content of our phone conversations, we have no privacy rights in the numbers we call. The rationale was that we share those numbers with the phone company. The intrusion mattered little at the time because if the police wanted to reconstruct someone’s circle of contacts, they had to undertake the enormously time-consuming process of manually linking phone number to phone number.
Today, though, with a few computer commands, the government can easily reconstruct our entire direct and extended network of phone and email contacts, as well as (using the GPS signals from our phone) everywhere we visit. That astonishingly detailed picture of our lives – our metadata — can be more revealing of private matters than even the contents of our communications.
Moreover, the claim that we give up our privacy rights by sharing this data with communications companies makes no sense. We “share” the contents of our emails as well, and those are better protected by the 4th Amendment. Moreover, in today’s world, we have no real choice but to share our contact data if we are to communicate with anyone other than by word of mouth. In what amounted to a warning, a majority of the Supreme Court justices hinted last year that at least some of this data should receive 4th Amendment protection. The administration should get in front of the issue and propose legislation before the court rules for it.
Second, recognize the privacy rights of non-Americans outside the United States. Because the courts have interpreted the U.S. Constitution to protect the rights of American citizens and legal residents everywhere, but non-Americans only in the United States, the U.S. government recognizes no privacy rights for non-Americans abroad. It thus intercepts even the content of their communications with few restrictions. Needless to say, that intrusion does not go over well with the rest of the world. This narrow view of privacy also lets the government review the content when Americans communicate with others overseas, so long as the American is not the “target” of the surveillance. In a world where international communication is routine, this parochial view of privacy makes no sense.
Moreover, it is a disaster for U.S. Internet companies, which aspire to serve the world but risk losing business to competitors in foreign countries that recognize privacy rights for non-Americans. And if distrust of the United States yields pressure to move servers to where users are, all companies become more vulnerable to probing by governments like China, whose interest may not be simply fighting terrorism but also fighting dissent. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, international human rights law protects everyone, including the right to privacy. That’s not how the U.S. government likes to read the law, but it should.
Third, treat privacy rights as implicated as soon as information is collected. One favorite refrain of the NSA is to claim that our privacy rights are not affected when our communications are scooped up and stored in a government computer, only when an official examines that information. The NSA then insists we have nothing to worry about because the rules for “querying” this information are strict. But that logic crumbles on examination. Would our privacy interest in blocking the government from placing a video camera in our bedroom begin only when someone actually looked at the film?
Moreover, once our communications are in government computers, they are there for the long haul — in some cases five years or more — yet rules on querying them can change with administration or even time. The government claims it needs to store our communications because private companies may erase them too soon, but people tend to be more comfortable with private storage (competition is a restraint on private abuse that does not exist for the government). In any event, the NSA has been unable to identify any terrorist plot that would have remained concealed but for its undifferentiated scooping up of our metadata. That is true for even the most recent parts of its vast database, let alone the parts held for five or more years.
Fourth, revamp the FISA court. The administration’s case for the legality of its electronic surveillance depends on scrutiny by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, yet the court hardly engenders confidence. Its members are hand-picked by Chief Justice John Roberts (until recently, he picked only conservative Republican appointees), it hears only from the government, and its opinions have mostly been kept secret. It is difficult for any judge to evaluate the government’s claims when no one is there to challenge its evidence and arguments, especially in so technically complex an area as electronic surveillance — as the court’s chief judge recently conceded. Efforts to justify this process by analogy to judges who privately hear from only the government to approve an ordinary search warrant are off base because most of those warrants can ultimately be challenged in a public adversarial hearing as part of a criminal prosecution.
At minimum, as Obama has suggested, the FISA court should hear from a government-appointed “devil’s advocate,” who would have the necessary security clearances and could challenge the government’s case without tipping off the surveillance target. That person should have the right to appeal adverse rulings to a higher tribunal and ultimately the Supreme Court. A presumption of public disclosure should govern all FISA court opinions about general surveillance policy and the right to privacy, since excessive secrecy has helped the surveillance state flourish.
Fifth, protect whistleblowers. The whistleblower protection provided to government employees who expose evidence of wrongdoing does not extend to those who disclose what is deemed national security information. Whistleblowers facing prosecution can’t even defend themselves by showing that their disclosures caused no harm and promoted the public interest. Wrongdoing involving this information is supposed to be revealed only to an agency’s inspector general or to the congressional intelligence committees. Yet government employees who tried to use these procedures to complain about NSA overreaching faced retaliation and even prosecution – which might help explain why Snowden skipped these mechanisms and went directly to the media. The problem is aggravated by the government’s temptation to protect information that is simply embarrassing or politically fraught rather than truly a matter of national security. A better balance should be struck between the government’s interest in keeping certain information secret and Americans’ right to know when government activities violate their rights.
Finally, appoint a meaningful reform commission. There’s a real need for an independent reform group with the security clearances and technical expertise needed to review all aspects of U.S. electronic surveillance and to publicly suggest reforms. The five-person group that Obama recently created purports to be such a commission, but its mandate as publicly announced does not even mention privacy, going only so far as to ask whether U.S. intelligence collection “appropriately account[s] for other policy considerations.” Only after the group’s first meeting did a White House press release finally mention the “p———” word as well as “civil liberties.” The White House should make clear that these key concerns are part of the group’s mandate, including the privacy rights of both Americans and non-Americans.
We have learned enough about the NSA’s overreach to know there are real problems with its electronic surveillance. Obama arguing that we should just trust him will no longer placate concerns. Real reform is needed to convince us that in the NSA’s preoccupation with security, our privacy rights have not been lost.